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ABSTRACT 
We herein use a world Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 143 potential trade 
reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). 
Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining 
and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions 
adopted by the trade negotiators. When real income is the objective and services are excluded, or when 
optimizing terms of trade is the objective, the Nash solution is the status quo. Trade liberalization is 
feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Our 
assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a GDP below a certain 
threshold improves the bargaining process, regardless of the governments’ objective. Formation of 
coalition, such as the G20, constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich 
members. We also find that side payments may be a solution, but represent a very high share of the global 
income gain.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The trade negotiations led under the banner of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) have been 
complex, as highlighted by the Cancún summit of September 2003 and the Geneva meeting of July 2008. 
These international meetings have been hindered by numerous quarrels among World Trade Organization 
(WTO) members over various issues: the United States (US) vs. China and India over the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism, Brazil vs. the European Union (EU) over agricultural tariffs, the EU and US vs. 
emerging countries over industrial liberalization, and so on. Until July 2004, there was a general feeling 
that negotiations had reached a stalemate. The Geneva meeting in July 2008 largely reaffirmed the 
perception that the DDA is a failure,
1 although WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy stated that: "looking 
at what is on the table now, members believe that the Doha round is still worth fighting for."
2
During this meeting, Pascal Lamy tried to cut a deal among seven countries (the EU, US, China, 
India, Australia, Japan, and Brazil). This initiative was criticized (see Third World Network 2008
    
3) 
because the WTO rules call for consensus.
4 Another distinctive feature of these negotiations was the 
emergence of country coalitions (e.g., the G20, G90, and G10
5), which played an active role in the 
bargaining process. Another new player was the "Aid For Trade" package; according to the WTO, this 
package constitutes further assistance for developing countries "to increase their capacity to take 
advantage of more open markets.”
6
Strategic analysis of international trade negotiations is common in the economic literature. 
Johnson (1953) studies tariff equilibrium between two large countries and shows that free trade may be 
negotiated through international cooperation unless there is a large asymmetry in import elasticities. In a 
later work (Johnson 1965), Johnson examines an international trade framework where the surplus of 
domestic producers is over-weighted compared to public revenues and consumer surplus, and where 
trading partners exchange reduced production in import-competing sectors for increased production in 
exporting sectors. Mayer (1981) considers the case of two domestic lobbies with divergent tariff interests 
and shows that this conflict of interests may prevent the negotiation of free trade between two large 
countries. The Prisoners’ dilemma is used by Riezman (1982) to show that the outcome of a non-
cooperative game between large countries is tariff equilibrium, whereas negotiation can lead to a return to 
 Some observers, however, described this initiative as financial 
compensation for countries that are expected to suffer losses under the agreement: "first and most 
straightforward is the political motivation often ascribed to the rich countries, namely, that aid for trade 
is an instrument to ‘buy’ progress in the Doha round" (Stiglitz and Charlton 2006, p4; see also Evenett 
2005b). 
The objective of the present research is to provide a strategic analysis of these negotiations. In 
particular, we examine whether these trade negotiations can reach a pro-liberalization outcome, and if so, 
which packages may be approved. If no pro-liberalization outcome is possible, we ask the following 
questions: Which countries are preventing the achievement of an agreement, and why? Is there any way 
to change the negotiation rules in order to achieve a pro-liberalization outcome? How can we explain the 
creation of coalitions, and do they thwart the success of the negotiations?  
                                                       
1 The Economist, July 31, 2008. 
2 Report to the WTO General Council, July 31, 2008. 
3 http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo20080737.htm. 
4 The July 2008 Geneva group was supposed to identify a compromise representing interests well beyond those 
of group members. 
5 The G20 includes 20 emerging countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and generally plays an 
active role in favor of agricultural liberalization. It is led by Brazil and India, and includes China and South Africa. 
The G90 is a set of 90 poor countries with more defensive pro-poor interests (most African countries are members of 
this group). The G10 includes 10 countries, mainly from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD); these include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. The G10 
primarily seeks to impede agricultural liberalization.  
6 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/background_e.htm.  
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free trade, which is Pareto-optimal. Baldwin and Clarke (1988) analyze the Tokyo round as a bargaining 
process between the EU and US, where both trading partners try to minimize an overall welfare loss 
function. The authors conclude that: "while the final set of rates improved the welfare position of both the 
United States and the European Community as compared to their initial positions, the final outcome was 
inferior to that given by the various formulas or the different game-theoretic outcomes" (Baldwin and 
Clarke 1988, p283). Tyers (1990) identifies policy preferences that are implicit in actual European and 
Japanese tariff patterns and uses the derived weights and their associated objective functions to assess 
which tariff reforms could be negotiated by both countries.  
We think that the strategic context of the DDA is far different from that of previous rounds. A 
new feature is, obviously, the number of players. In 2008, Cape Verde became the 153
rd WTO member. 
At the time of the first round, which took place in 1947 in Geneva, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) consisted of only 23 members. Moreover, the economic sizes of WTO member countries 
vary widely.  For example, the populations of members such as St Kitts and Nevis are under 50,000, 
while that of China (another member) is about 1.325 billion (bn) people. In 2006, Norway’s GDP per 
capita was US$43,500 per year, in Purchasing Power Parity, while that of Malawi was only US$700 
(these figures come from World Development Indicators 2008). The large number of players and the 
diversity of their economic situations are especially important because that the WTO rules call for 
consensus. Moreover, while the outcomes of previous rounds were largely negotiated between the EU and 
US, the number of active participants in the current bargaining process has increased. The trade 
representatives of Brazil, India, and Australia, for example, now actively participate in the bargaining 
process. Another strategic characteristic of this round, as stated earlier, is the emergence of coalitions 
whose roles have not been formally defined. The immediate question that comes to mind, therefore, is 
whether these new features (the increased number of WTO members and the creation of coalitions) can 
explain the apparent stalemate of these negotiations since the second half of 2008.  
Recent methodological developments allow for a more systematic study of the bargaining 
process. Thanks to improvements in computation ability, the availability of databases on world 
macroeconomic variables (e.g., the GTAP database; Dimaranan and McDougall 2005) and market access 
(e.g. the MAcMAP_HS6 database; Bouët et al. 2008), and the development of multi-country multi-sector 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, it is possible to simulate numerous scenarios of trade 
reform and evaluate their impacts on each WTO member. This may be done against the economic 
theories of negotiation developed by Nash (1953), Shapley (1953), and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). 
Hence, the combination of theoretical developments and modeling capacities allows us to model 
negotiations among numerous countries/regions with microeconomic foundations.  
To analyze the potential outcome of the DDA, we use the MIRAGE (Modelling International 
Relations in Applied General Equilibrium)
7
We find that a pro-liberalization agreement is very difficult to achieve due to the heterogeneity of 
WTO members. There are, however, several possible solutions. For example, the exclusion of small 
countries improves the efficiency of the negotiation process, regardless of the governments’ objectives. 
The creation of coalitions potentially allows developing countries to act against the solutions selected by 
rich countries. It may be possible and useful to expand the domain of trade negotiations. Finally, game 
theory indicates that side payments may be effective, in that large actors can maximize the “size of the 
 model of the world economy and recent databases covering 
market access and domestic support. Unlike traditional studies that begin with a particular scenario, we 
herein study a set of agreements representative of discussions at the time the Cancun ministerial meeting 
failed. These include 143 trade shocks that are expected to represent the whole set of negotiations, and are 
studied with the help of the MIRAGE model. Inside the domain defined by all these potential outcomes, 
the Nash solution, as defined by the theory of axiomatic bargaining, is selected. The Nash solution defines 
an efficient and rational solution to any bargaining problem.  
                                                       
7 The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII) in Paris. A full description of the model is available in Decreux and Valin (2007).  
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cake” for their purposes by using side payments to compensate losers and buy the agreement of each 
player.  
We arrive at two specific conclusions concerning agriculture and development: First, the 
liberalization of agriculture is a key element of the negotiations. It substantially increases the magnitude 
of expected gains and their dispersion, redistributing the gains in favor of small countries.  Second, some 
poor countries may lose in the face of international trade reform, due to eroded preferences and/or 
increasing world agricultural prices. The ‘Aid For Trade’ component of the current negotiations is 
especially important, as it may entail financial compensation for these countries.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our methodology. Section 3 broadly 
characterizes the economic impacts of the 143 scenarios. Section 4 applies the theory of cooperative 
games and examines three potential mechanisms for improving the efficiency of the negotiations. Section 
5 studies the emergence and effects of coalitions. Section 6 concludes.  
4 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
The MIRAGE Model 
This study uses the MIRAGE model of the world economy in order to assess the economic consequences 
of various trade reforms. The MIRAGE model is a multinational, multisector CGE model (see Decreux 
and Valin 2007). In each country/region, a representative consumer maximizes a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES)-Linear Expenditure System (LES) utility function under a budget constraint to 
allocate his/her income across goods. The origin of goods is determined by a CES nested structure 
following the Armington assumption.
8
Data 
  Northern countries/regions are assumed to produce higher-quality 
industrial goods compared to those supplied by Southern countries/regions. On the production side, value 
added and intermediate goods are complements under a Leontief hypothesis. The value added is a CES 
function of unskilled labor and a composite of skilled labor and capital; this allows us to include less 
substitutability between the last two production factors. In agriculture and mining, production also 
depends on land and natural resources. Investment is savings-driven and the current account is assumed to 
be constant in terms of world GDP. We use a static version of the MIRAGE model, with a perfect 
competition hypothesis and without modeling of foreign direct investment. The main purpose of this 
modeling scenario is to simulate many potential trade reforms and represent as exhaustively as possible 
the entire domain of the negotiation. We use perfect competition instead of imperfect competition, since 
the latter framework requires supplementary data (e.g., the number of firms, mark-up, and magnitude of 
scale economies) for calibration purposes, and these are difficult to gather for many countries/regions. We 
acknowledge that this theoretical option can deeply affect the impact of a trade reform (see Bouët 2008 
and Tongeren et al. 2001). However, the use of the static version is justified by the fact that we are not 
interested in what happens between “now” and “then,” but instead are only concerned with the final 
impact on the various countries/regions.  
The first source of data is GTAP6.1 (Dimaranan and McDougall 2005), which provides world 
macroeconomic accounts and trade flows for the year 2001. Notably, we seek to describe the complexity 
of the negotiations at the beginning of the process. Of course it would be worthwhile to study whether the 
current trade features have made the negotiations even more difficult than they were at the beginning of 
the process. However, we contend that the main reasons for the present stalemate are:  
i  the large number of participants with heterogeneous economic and trade characteristics; 
ii  the dispersion of protection and other distortions across sectors; and  
iii  the existence of trade preferences and regional agreements that generate preferential access.  
When considering these three points, no major change has occurred in the world trading system 
since 2001, even where new policies have been put in place (e.g., the US Farm Bills implemented in 2002 
and 2008, the Economic Partnership Agreements, the recent developments in the European Common 
Agricultural Policies, etc.).
9
Our market access data comes from the MacMap_HS6 database (Bouët et al. 2008), which 
measures protection in 2001 and includes all regional agreements and trade preferences existing at this 
time. A database of bound duties is also used (Bchir et al. 2006); this database applies tariff formulae to 
bound duties instead of applied duties. The latter is reduced only when the bound duty is cut under the 
applied tariff. As a result, the interaction between bound, Most Favored Nation (MFN) applied, and 
 
                                                       
8 This is a traditional but key assumption in the modeling of international trade flows and trade preferences. We 
rely here on GTAP Armington trade elasticities; this is a rather conservative approach.  
9 Our baseline takes into consideration the US Farm Bill in place in 2001 and the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
Initiative.  
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preferential duties is accounted for in our simulations (all computations are performed at the six-digit 
level). It is important to account for the binding overhang effect, particularly in developing countries, 
which often have large binding overhangs. 
We further use a database on domestic support constructed from the OECD’s data on Production 
Subsidy Equivalent (PSE). This database takes into account trends in agricultural policies established by 
the US Farm bill in place in 2001 and the European Agenda of 2000. The existing databases on market 
access in services are incomplete and not reliable enough for our systematic analysis of trade negotiations 
conducted under the aegis of the WTO. In the GTAP database, protection in services is insufficiently 
assessed. Information on this parameter may be gained from frequency indexes (Hoekman 1996) and 
estimations based on price differences (Trewin 2000, Kalirajan et al. 2000) or residuals of the gravity 
equation (Francois and Hoekman 1999), but these do not fully account for the complexity of trade barriers 
in this sector. Whatever the methodological foundation, these assessments suffer from a lack of 
robustness or require too much information when seeking a global outlook of market access in services 
(see Chen and Schembri 2002). To cope with this lack of data, we impose a uniform ad valorem import 
tariff of 20% in all countries/regions and across all business service activities. This is a transaction cost 
that generates rents for economic agents in the importing country/region. 
We acknowledge that applying a homogenous 20% import tariff on business services is a very 
crude modeling approach. Accordingly, we present our results with and without this modeling element, in 
order to check how it affects our findings. Moreover, one of the three solutions that we propose as a 
remedy for the stalemate in trade negotiations is an expansion of the domain on which WTO members 
bargain. In this way, we ask whether a broader domain of negotiation could bring more flexibility and 
efficiency to the process. 
Geographical decomposition 
Our initial expectation is that the heterogeneity of negotiating countries could lead to DDA failure. 
Therefore, when selecting the strategy of geographical decomposition to be used for this work, we give 
priority to analyzing the structural diversity of the various WTO members. Of course, the geographic 
decomposition is a key element of the methodological design of this study, as the characteristics of the 
countries/regions that we choose can deeply affect the outcome.  
We think that the main elements that determine a country’s stance in the negotiations are as follows:  
i  the average level of trade-related distortions that affect its imports and exports;  
ii  the sector and partner dispersion of its protection;  
iii  its economic size and dependence on trade; and  
iv  its concentration of imports and exports by product and geography.  
On the basis of the GTAP6.1 database, we select countries/regions that are specific in the 
following terms: trade specialization [e.g., Brazil and Argentina (agriculture) vs. China and Bangladesh 
(industry) vs. India (services)]; preferential access received [e.g. Bangladesh (which is a beneficiary of 
the Everything But Arms initiative) vs. China, India, Indonesia and Thailand (which are not), or Mexico 
and Canada (which have preferential access to the US) vs. all other OECD countries (which do not)]; 
preferential access given (the EU vs. Japan and Australia); or the geographic structure of trade flows (all 
continents are represented). Another utilized element is the structure of protection, in terms of average 
level (OECD vs. Middle Income Countries vs. Low Income Countries) and sector-wide dispersion of 
protection (the EU, Japan, Korea and Taiwan vs. the US). We also account for the diversity in economic 
size and dependence on trade (Bangladesh vs. China and India, New Zealand and Chile vs. the US and 
EU). We seek to avoid blurring country differences through inadequate aggregation. For example, most 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries are characterized by a high geographic concentration of exports 
(towards the EU and US) and have been granted large preferences (through the Everything But Arms –
EBA- and African Growth Opportunity Act –AGOA- initiatives). Most Mediterranean countries  
6 
specialize in gas, oil, and apparel products, and have been granted free access to the EU in industry (for 
more details on this geographic decomposition, see Bouët and Laborde 2004). However, given that we 
herein simulate 143 trade reforms, we must use a reasonable number of countries/regions. In the present 
work, we select 25 countries/regions.  
Table 1 presents our geographic decomposition.
10 In the context of inter-country/region trade and 
protection, this decomposition captures 95.5% of the world tariff revenue (which can be considered a 
measure of the global distortion in play) and 71.3% of world trade (which is the macroeconomic variable 
affected by the distortion).
11
Table 1.  Geographic decomposition 
 This, therefore, appears to be a solid basis for our modeling exercise. 
R egion  GT AP code  Coalition 
Argentina  arg - Argentina  G22/Cairns 
Australia  aus - Australia  Cairns 
Bang  bgd - Bangladesh  G90 
Brazil  bra - Brazil  G22/Cairns 
Canada  can - Canada  Cairns 
Chile  chl - Chile  G22/Cairns 
China  chn - China  G22 
CIS  rus - Russia, xsu - Rest of Former Soviet Union   
EFTA  che - Switzerland, xef - Rest of EFTA  G10 
EU25  aut, bel, dnk, fin, fra, deu, gbr, grc, irl, ita, lux, nld, prt, esp, swe, cyp, cze, hun, mlt, 
pol, svk, svn, est, lva, ltu - 25 countries of the European Union 
 
India  ind - India  G22 
Indonesia  idn - Indonesia  Cairns 
Japan  jpn - Japan  G10 
Korea_Tw  kor - South Korea, twn - Taiwan  G10 
MeditCount/  tur - Turkey, xme - Rest of Middle eEast, mar - Morocco , xnf - Rest of North 
Africa 
G90 
Mexico  mex - Mexico  G22 
NewZealand  nzl - New-Zeland  Cairns 
RoAsia  xea -Rest of East Asia , mys - Malaysia, phl - Philippines, vnm - Viet Nam, xse - 
Rest of Southeast Asia, lka - Sri Lanka, xsa - Rest of Asia 
 
RofCentAm  Rest of Central America and of the Caribbean  G22 
RofSouthAm  Rest of South America  G22 
ROW  xoc - Rest of Oceania, hkg - Hong Kong, sgp - Singapore, xna - Rest of North 
America, col - Colombia, per - Peru, ven - Venezuela, ury - Uruguay, xsm - Rest of 
South America, xer -  Rest of Europe, alb - Albania, bgr - Bulgaria, hrv - Croatia, 
rom - Romania 
 
SouthAfrica  bwa - Botswana, zaf - South Africa, xsc -Rest of South Africa Custom Union  G90/G22/Cairns 
SubSahAf  mwi - Malawi, moz - Mozambique, tza - Tanzania, zmb - Zambia, zwe - Zimbabwe, 
mdg - Madagascar, uga - Uganda, xss - Rest of Subsaharan Africa 
G90 
Thailand  tha - Thailand  G22/Cairns 
USA  usa - United States   
Note:   EFTA for European Free Trade Association; EU25 for European Union (25 countries); Korea_Tw for Korea and 
Taiwan; MediterraneanCo. For Mediterranean Countries; ROCentAm for Rest of Central America; ROAsia for Rest of Asia; 
RoSouAm for Rest of South America; SubSahAf  for SubSaharan Africa. 
   
                                                       
10 In 2001 the EU had 15 members, not 25, but the trade integration process was almost finished for the 10 
newly enrolled members.  
11 These calculations are realized using the MAcMapHS6 database.   
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Sectoral Decomposition 
Our sector decomposition focuses on agriculture; we identify 23 sectors, 10 of which are agricultural (see 
Table 2). In agriculture, large distortions are seen in the following sectors: Rice, Sugar, Cereals nec (not 
elsewhere classified), Livestock and Meat, Meat Products, and Milk and Dairy Products. In industry, 
large distortions are mainly seen in the Textile and Wearing. 
Table 2.  Sector decomposition 
Sector Code  Description  GT AP Code 
Agri_ind  Food products, not elsewhere classified  ofd, vol 
Bev_Tob  Beverages and Tobacco  b_t 
Bus_serv  Business Services  isr, obs, ofi 
Cereals  Cereals, not elsewhere classified  gro, wht 
Chim_ind  Chemical industry  crp, p_c 
Dairy_prod  Milk and Dairy Products  mil, rmk 
Electronic  Electronic  ome 
Lvst_Meat  Livestock and Meat  ctl, oap 
Mach_ind  Equipment goods  omf 
Meat  Meat Products  cmt, omt 
Metal_ind  Metal Industry  fmp, i_s, nfm 
OthCrop  Other crops, not elsewhere classified  ocr, osd, pfb 
OthInd  Other Industries  ely, nmm 
OthPrim  Other Primary Products  coa, frs, fsh, gas, oil, omn, wol 
OthServ  Other Services  cns, dwe, gdt, osg, ros, trd, wtr, ele 
Rice  Rice  pcr, pdr 
Sugar  Sugar  c_b, sgr 
Textiles  Textile  tex 
Tran_ind  Transportation Industry  mvh, otn 
Trans_com  Transportation and Telecommunication  atp, cmn, otp, wtp 
Veg_fruit  Vegetable and Fruit  v_f 
Wearing  Wearing, Apparel  lea, wap 
Wood_paper  Wood and paper  lum, ppp 
 
The Objective of Trade Negotiators 
Trade liberalization has various impacts on an economy. Changes in relative prices lead to variations in 
nominal and real remunerations, reallocation of productive factors, gains in efficiency, variations in 
public revenues, modifications of real exchange rates and of terms of trade, etc. Therefore, a strict 
definition of national objectives is necessary for analytical purposes. Such objectives must represent the 
elements taken into account by negotiators. This leads us to consider four indicators in this study: 
i  The Hicksian equivalent variation of the representative agent. This indicator, which means 
that governments seek to maximize national welfare, has often been adopted in the literature 
and has robust microeconomic foundations. However, within the government’s objective, 
consumers’ interests are weighted as equal to producers’ interests and public receipts. 
ii  Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is often cited as an objective by negotiators, 
although this statement lacks a microeconomic foundation.   
8 
iii  Export growth. This is a mercantilist objective frequently quoted by negotiators.
12
iv  Optimizing terms of trade. This is another mercantilist objective, even though it implies that 
trade is a zero-sum game. 
 
These objectives appear to be gross approximations, but we will limit our analysis to them 
because it would be unviable to design a political model specifically adapted to every WTO member. It 
could be argued that real GDP and welfare are very closely linked objectives. In fact, if trade is initially 
balanced, we find that the change in Hicksian variation as a share of initial expenditure is the change in 
nominal GDP deflated by the change in the cost of expenditure. However, trade is not initially balanced in 
our modeling exercise. Moreover, we herein define real GDP by deflating nominal GDP by production 
prices rather than the cost of expenditure.  
Optimizing terms of trade is an important objective, and are considered politically important by 
authors such as Bagwell and Staiger (1999). Terms of trade are usually improved when trading partners 
liberalize versus when they fail to liberalize. When only one country liberalizes and others do not, its 
terms of trade deteriorate, while a country that does not liberalize while others do may experience 
deterioration of its terms of trade due to its initial free access to foreign markets (this is the situation 
created by eroded preferences). In this sense, optimizing terms of trade can accurately characterize the 
mercantilist spirit of trade negotiators. It is possible to consider a trade reform wherein all WTO members 
receive improved terms of trade, in that the WTO does not comprise all countries in the world. Of course, 
this case is less conceivable given an international organization composed of 153 countries rather than the 
23 present at the first negotiation. 
Scenarios 
A set of trade shocks is simulated in order to give a fairly accurate representation of the fundamental 
interests of WTO members and the scope of potential negotiations possible under the DDA at the 
inception of the negotiations. From this point of view, it would not be correct to design scenarios around 
the latest modalities, which were published in 2008 and do not reflect the problems associated with the 
negotiations at their outset. Therefore, we design scenarios around the main dimensions discussed during 
the first years of the round. The modeled shocks are designed around five key dimensions of the 
negotiations:   
i  The extent to which import duties are cut;  
ii  The degree of harmonization (progressivity) adopted in the tariff-reduction formulae;  
iii  The provision of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT);  
iv  Global or sector-level negotiations; and v. cuts in export subsidies.
13
We consider services (A), industry (called NAMA for Non Agricultural Market Access; B), 
agriculture (called AMA for Agricultural Market Access; C) and reduction of export subsidies (D) (see 
Table 3). We suppose that liberalization in services takes the form of a 50% reduction in the previously 
defined transaction cost. Liberalization in industry has two aspects: first, two Swiss formulae are 
simulated with coefficients of a=5% and a=10%. Second, the agreement either includes or does not 
include SDT. In the former case, the coefficient of the Swiss formula is doubled for developing countries 
and tripled for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), thereby reflecting the reduced extent to which market 
access is improved in those countries. We test complete liberalization in the textile-apparel sector. This “0 
  
                                                       
12 Herein the objective is of course the maximization of exports growth. Another option would be to consider 
defensive objectives, such as limiting import increases. This is apparently supported by some governments, although 
maximization of export growth is a more common national objective. As we had to limit the number of tested 
objectives, we did not examine minimization of import growth. 
13 Some of these aspects are still key elements of the trade negotiations today. However, this study focuses on 
the potential outcomes of the DDA when this negotiation was initiated.  
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for 0 option” is added to a scenario in which the Swiss formula for the other industrial sectors is set to 
5%, and there is no SDT. In agriculture, two Swiss formulae are also considered, with less harmonizing 
coefficients (a=15% and a=30%), and SDT is the same as for industry. As the EU proposed a linear 
reduction of import duties by a 33% coefficient, we also test this non-harmonizing formula; in this case, 
the coefficient is set to 25% for developing countries and 15% for LDCs. Finally, we consider a 75% cut 
in export subsidies.  
In all trade shocks, duties < 3% are annulled. From a global point of view, we simulate 143 trade 
shocks. To facilitate identification, we use the following code (see Table 3): a trade shock is designated in 
the format‘s ABCD,’ where A, B, C, D is an integer belonging to {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.  For instance, trade 
shock s0121 corresponds to (see Table 3):  
i  the status quo in services;  
ii  a Swiss formula for industry having a 10% coefficient and no SDT;  
iii  a Swiss formula for agriculture having a 25% coefficient and SDT; and  
iv  a 75% reduction in export subsidies 
Table 3.  Definition of scenarios 
  Domain 
  A  B  C  D 
Value  Services  NAMA  AMA  Exp. Subsidies 
0  Statu-quo  Statu-quo  Statu-quo  Statu-quo 
1  Reduc. by 50%  a=10%  a=25%  Reduc. by 75% 
2  n.a.  a=10%+SDT  a=25%+SDT  n.a. 
3  n.a.  a=5%  a=15%  n.a. 
4  n.a.  a=5%+SDT  a=15%+SDT  n.a. 
5  n.a.  0-0  Linear formula + SDT  n.a. 




3.  ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF POTENTIAL REFORMS 
The impact of the five modalities on the level of applied protection is shown in Table 4, split between the 
agricultural (AMA) and non-agricultural (NAMA) sectors. The tariff formulae are applied at the most 
disaggregated level, and then averages are calculated and compared to the initial averages; this procedure 
yields a much more detailed assessment of the potential impact of a tariff formula compared to procedures 
that apply tariff cuts to average applied import duties. Moreover, we account for the interaction between 
bound duties, MFN-applied duties and preferential duties. 
Table 4.  Impact of various tariff cuts on applied import duties 
%   I nitial level  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5 











Argentina  11.8  12.7  10.6  6.9  11.7  10.0  8.8  4.3  11.0  6.9  11.8 
Australia  3.1  5.4  2.2  3.0  2.2  3.0  1.9  2.1  1.9  2.1  2.2 
Bangladesh  19.4  15.7  13.4  1.8  18.8  2.2  9.5  1.5  18.1  2.2  19.3 
Brazil  11.1  12.5  9.6  6.5  10.9  9.4  7.8  4.0  10.1  6.5  11.1 
Canada  23.2  2.9  6.0  1.7  6.0  1.7  4.3  1.3  4.3  1.3  15.7 
Chile  7.0  6.8  7.0  6.8  7.0  6.8  7.0  4.3  7.0  6.8  7.0 
China  23.5  7.4  9.9  3.7  12.9  4.8  7.7  2.7  10.7  3.7  18.5 
CIS  16.9  8.8  16.8  8.8  16.9  8.8  16.8  8.8  16.9  8.8  16.9 
EFTA  60.0  1.5  11.9  0.6  11.9  0.6  8.2  0.4  8.2  0.4  50.9 
EU25  24.4  2.4  7.7  1.3  7.7  1.3  5.6  0.9  5.6  0.9  17.2 
India  57.2  30.0  19.8  6.9  31.1  10.4  13.8  4.5  22.5  7.0  48.6 
Indonesia  11.4  6.0  5.9  3.2  6.9  3.9  4.8  2.3  6.2  3.2  9.9 
Japan  49.9  1.7  11.0  0.9  11.0  0.9  7.8  0.7  7.8  0.7  43.0 
Medit. Count.  28.3  7.6  12.4  5.3  14.6  5.7  10.0  4.8  12.0  5.2  26.4 
Mexico  41.1  10.4  14.2  5.3  19.5  7.6  10.7  3.5  15.6  5.3  34.3 
New Zealand  2.3  2.8  1.9  2.5  1.9  2.5  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  2.1 
Rest of Asia  16.0  9.6  8.2  3.4  9.3  4.1  7.5  2.9  8.6  3.5  15.4 
Rof World  5.2  1.9  3.7  1.2  3.9  1.4  3.2  1.0  3.5  1.2  4.9 
Rof Central Am.  16.8  4.7  9.2  3.0  11.6  3.7  7.2  2.1  9.9  3.0  14.8 
Rof South Am.  15.7  11.0  11.7  8.6  13.5  9.7  9.7  7.4  12.0  8.5  15.2 
South Africa  21.8  7.3  7.9  3.1  10.1  4.3  6.2  2.0  8.6  3.1  21.6 
S. Korea-Taiwan  41.8  7.8  11.2  3.3  11.2  3.3  8.2  2.3  8.2  2.3  29.7 
SubSaharan Af.  17.9  12.2  13.0  2.5  15.6  3.0  9.9  2.1  14.6  2.7  17.9 
Thailand  27.1  11.5  14.0  3.8  19.1  5.2  10.4  2.6  15.4  3.8  23.4 
United States  5.5  2.2  3.1  1.0  3.1  1.0  2.5  0.7  2.5  0.7  4.3 
Sources:  MAcMapHS6 and authors’ calculations 
Note:  Reference group weights. See Bouet et al. 2008 for a detailed explanation. 
The most protected commodities are found in the agricultural sector; their protection is especially 
high in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, India, Japan, and the South Korea/Taiwan 
region. Industry imports are relatively restricted in India, Bangladesh and most of the remaining MICs. In 
agriculture, the impact of the Swiss formula is large due to the presence of tariff peaks. In the EFTA 
region, new agricultural protection is a fifth of the initial one under a 25% Swiss formula (case 1), and  
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reduced by 86% with a 15% coefficient (case 3). For Japan, these reductions are similar. A linear formula 
has a much smaller impact (case 5), as it does not cut the tariff peaks as substantially; the average 
agricultural protection in the "Rest of Europe" region is reduced by only 15%, while that in Japan is cut 
by only 13.8%. In Australia, New Zealand and the US, the impact of various agricultural reforms is 
limited. In developing countries/regions, however, the effect of agricultural reform is very substantial; for 
example, in India the 25% Swiss formula cuts protection by 65%, while a 15% coefficient cuts protection 
by 76%. As expected, the inclusion of SDT yields a smaller reduction in protection for developing 
countries/regions. 
In industry, the impact of the Swiss formula is softened because the tariff dispersion is smaller. 
Liberalization can be substantial under a 15% coefficient in emerging countries; under this modality, 
industrial protection is reduced by 85% in India and 68% in Brazil. Once again, the inclusion of SDT is 
associated with less liberalization in developing countries/regions. 
Table 5.  World optimum 
  With liberalization in services  Without liberalization in services 
Optimal scenario  s1531  s0531 
Eq. Variation  US$105.05bn or +0.33%  US$93.8bn or 0,29% 
Real GDP  US$127.21bn or 0.41%  US$114.99bn or 0.37% 
Note:   s1531 implies liberalization in services (1), the strongest liberalization (a=5%) in NAMA, including 0-0 in textiles and 
wearing (5), the strongest liberalization (a=15%) in AMA (3), and the reduction of export subsidies. s0531 is the same scenario 
without services liberalization. 
The trade reforms that maximize world gains are presented in Table 5. Scenario s1531 is 
characterized by liberalization in services, a very harmonizing Swiss formula without SDT in industry or 
agriculture, a "0 for 0" option in textile and apparel, and a 75% reduction in exports subsidies; this yields 
the largest increase in world welfare. The optimum scenario is s0531 if we exclude negotiation in 
services. If the criterion of interest adopted by governments is the augmentation of exports, the best 
scenario is s1530, under which export subsidies are not cut. The gains seen under this scenario in the 
present work (USD105 bn under the most liberalizing scenario) are comparable with those obtained in 
similar studies (Bchir et al. 2005 for example). 
For each of the 143 scenarios, Appendix 1 indicates the global gains (in USD bn, then in 
percentage), the un-weighted average gain in percent, and the standard deviation of gains (un-weighted). 
Global gain is important, as it measures the efficiency of the process. The un-weighted average gain in 
percent is also meaningful; when compared to global gain in percent, it indicates whether the trade reform 
favors large countries/regions (in which case the un-weighted average is less than the global gain in 
percent) or small countries/regions (in which case the un-weighted average is greater than the global gain 
in percent). A negative un-weighted average with a positive global gain indicates that there are many 
losers, and/or that small countries/regions are hurt by relatively large losses.  
A major part of the world gains comes from agricultural liberalization, due to the high level of 
initial protection. This finding is consistent with the conclusions of other studies, such as those of Van der 
Mensbrugghe and Beghin (2004), Francois et al. (2005), and Hertel and Keeney (2006). The world 
welfare gains from reforms s1000, s0500, s0030 and s0001 add up to US$101.53bn, but the only 
agricultural reform yields a US$75.35bn gain. As tariff peaks are numerous in this sector, the design of 
the formula under which imports duties are reduced is fundamental. To understand this element, let us 
compare the welfare gain seen when we apply a linear formula (s0050) versus one obtained from a very 
harmonizing formula (s0030). Systematically, the latter confers about US$60bn of supplementary 
equivalent variation (in Appendix 1, note the differences among the global gains obtained from scenarios 
s0030 and s0050, s0530 and s0550, s1530 and s1550, s1531 and s1551, etc.). 
Gains coming from liberalization of industry are smaller; in the best case scenario they add up to 
US$14bn. This corresponds to a very harmonizing Swiss formula, no SDT and with a "0 for 0" option in  
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textiles and apparel. A smaller initial protection explains these limited gains. Moreover, tariff peaks are 
less frequent. Two other elements are noteworthy. First, gains are over-additive; the sum of gains coming 
from elementary shocks is inferior to that derived from the scenario in which all these shocks are 
combined. Second, a cut in export subsidies is more fruitful if it is combined with a reduction in 
agricultural tariffs. Indeed, a reduction of these subsidies without any change in import duties brings a 
US$1bn welfare gain. When this reduction is added to a decrease in border protection, we see a much 
larger welfare gain: see the differences between s0531 and s0530, or between s1530 and s1531. One 
explanation for this is that reducing import duties increases trade flows. The same rate of export 
subsidization causes more distortion under larger trade flows.
14
Figure 1.  Distribution of scenarios by simple average and standard deviation of country gains 
 Thus, the modeled trade shocks generate 
varied global welfare gains and we see large variations in their distribution among the 25 
countries/regions. 
Figure 1 shows each scenario according to two characteristics: the un-weighted average gain in 
the percentage of initial real income (horizontal axis), and the standard error of the gains in the 
countries/regions (vertical axis). In the lower left corner of Figure 1, we see a set of 47 trade reforms 
characterized by negative or low un-weighted average gains and low standard deviations. One common 
characteristic of these scenarios is that they yield a relatively small global gain for the world economy 
(the maximum is US$41.2bn). In contrast, the minimum global gain predicted for the set of trade reforms 
located in the upper right corner is US$68.5bn. Thus, we see that the larger the world gain, the more 
unequally its distribution. 
 
Note:  NAMA for Non Agricultural Market Access; AMA for Agricultural Market Access; lib for liberalization. 
                                                       
14 We do not model the Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement (URAA) constraints on export subsidies in 
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All of the trade reforms in the lower left corner of the graph are not only characterized by 
relatively low global gains for the world economy, but also relatively small standard deviations and small 
un-weighted average gains. Reforms leading to negative un-weighted average gains are projected to hurt 
many countries/regions through losses and/or hurt some countries with large relative losses. All of these 
reforms lack liberalization in agriculture or include a linear tariff reduction in this sector. The distribution 
of welfare gains varies according to the modalities of each liberalization scenario. For instance, while 
generating the same increase in world welfare (US$14bn, i.e. a growth rate of 0.04%), the scenarios of 
agricultural liberalization under a linear formula (s0050) or a large industrial liberalization (s0500) give 
us contrasting pictures in terms of distribution. In the first case, total real income gain is more evenly 
shared out among players (whatever their economic size), the percent un-weighted average gain is greater 
than the world gain, and the standard deviation is somewhat low. In the second case, industrial 
liberalization benefits the richest countries/regions, such that the percent of un-weighted average gain is 
negative, while the world gain is positive. The standard deviation is about four-fold higher. 
Conversely, all reforms located in the upper right corner of the graph are characterized by a Swiss 
formula in agriculture, with or without SDT. For all scenarios in the upper right corner of the graph where 
a Swiss formula is applied on agricultural tariffs, the standard deviation of gains is high, but the un-
weighted average gain (in percent) is greater than the global gain for the world economy, implying that 
these reforms are supported by numerous countries/regions and large countries/regions do not capture 
most of the gains. Based on Appendix 1, comparison of scenarios s1500 and s1530, s1501 and 1531, 
s1400 and s1430, and s1401 and s1431 shows that a "progressive" liberalization in agriculture not only 
generates a major increase in the global gain captured by the world economy, it also yields a much larger 
un-weighted average gain (in percent); this suggests that there are numerous winners, but at the price of a 
higher standard deviation.  
The uneven distribution of the gains is understandable if we consider that the main effects are 
driven by agricultural liberalization. First, the cost of protection is quadratic for importing 
countries/regions. Therefore, we expect the gains to be concentrated in regions where the distortions were 
initially high. Second, for exporters, two complementary effects are in play, particularly for agricultural 
liberalization. First, the elimination of tariff peaks creates strong losses for exporters who initially enjoyed 
preferential access, but strong gains for non-preferred exporters; in this sense, developing 
countries/regions have contrasting interests. Furthermore, if agricultural liberalization drives the majority 
of the gains, such gains will be concentrated in countries/regions with stronger comparative advantages in 
this sector (e.g., the Cairns Group). In addition, the terms of trade will affect food prices, thereby creating 
opposite effects on net importers and net exporters of food products. Thus, liberalization of industry alone 
yields an unfair distribution of gains, while liberalization of agriculture alone confers large gains to 
numerous countries/regions, but these are more unequally distributed. Combining the two options 
increases the size of the cake, but with an even more unequal distribution (s1530). Therefore, agricultural 
liberalization is crucial in order to make the game politically acceptable.  
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4.  MODELING THE BARGAINING PROCESS 
We see above that the negotiating modalities have a huge impact on the distribution of gains and that it is 
not a trivial issue to study the feasibility of a positive outcome. Based on game theory, this section 
describes trade negotiations as a cooperative bargaining process among players. The Nash solution is 
exposed, according to several hypotheses about bargaining power.  
The Nash Solution  
Let us consider that the trade negotiation is a process of 25 countries/regions bargaining on 143 potential 
outcomes. Let   be the country/region m’s reference “payment” in the case that no agreement is 
reached, W
m(s) is the payment when the outcome s is adopted, and S is the set of 143 feasible outcomes. 
We assume that in the case of bargaining game failure, the outcome (also called the threat point) will be 
the status quo, i.e. . However, we can also imagine other cases, as follows: 
i  Countries/regions start trade wars, increasing their applied duties to the maximum allowed by 
their bound duties (or even further). This alternative would require us to model and solve the 
Nash non-cooperative game across the 25 countries/regions. 
ii  Countries/regions decide to negotiate preferential agreements. In this case, we would have to 
define an optimal trade agreement for each of the 25 countries/regions with any combinations 
of the 24 other countries/regions, as well as potential agreements with third parties. 
These two alternatives would require strenuous calculations that are beyond the scope of the 
current analysis. Here, we seek to understand, within a simple framework, the stalemate in which the 
trade negotiations have been stalled since 2001. Bouët and Laborde (2008) investigated the potential 
outcome of DDA failure, but the alternative scenarios they used are ad hoc and inconsistent with the 
game-theory approach discussed herein. 
In the following, we present Nash solutions without the inclusion of bargaining power, and then 
add bargaining power into the analysis.  
The Nash solution without bargaining power 
First, we consider that all countries/regions m participate in negotiations and have identical bargaining 
power, regardless of their geography, population, and economic size. The Nash solution is:  
 




  (2) 
Condition 2 ensures that the solution will be individually rational.  
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Table 6.  Nash solutions of the cooperative game 
  E quivalent 
variation 
R eal GDP  E xports  T erms of trade 
1 region, 1 voice  s1000  s1520  s1530  No solution 
1 country, 1 voice  s1000  s1510  s1530  No solution 
Economic weight  s1000  s1551  s1530  No solution 
Note:  s1000 is a status quo with liberalization only in services (a net gain for everyone in our modeling). 
s1510 implies liberalization in services (1), the strongest liberalization (a=5%) in NAMA (including 0-0 in textiles), a moderate 
liberalization (a=25% +SDT) in AMA, and no export subsidies reduction. s1520 differs from s1510 by the introduction of SDT in 
agriculture. On the contrary, s1530 is the same scenario, but with the strongest AMA liberalization (a=15%, no SDT). s1551 
implies liberalization in services (1), the strongest liberalization (a=5%) in NAMA, including 0-0 in textiles and wearing  (5), the 
weakest liberalization (linear reduction) in AMA (3) and the reduction of export subsidies. s0531 is the same scenario without 
services liberalization. 
 
Therefore the Nash solution is characterized by the following features:  
i  The outcome is individually rational (no player loses relative to the pre-negotiation situation). 
ii  The outcome is Pareto-optimal (no negotiable outcome is unanimously preferred).  
iii  The outcome depends on the initial point ("threat point").  
iv  The outcome may be democratic or it may reflect a given distribution of power among 
players ("bargaining powers"). The latter option is presented in subsection 4.1.2. 
These characteristics exemplify the uniqueness of the Nash solution. Moreover, unlike other 
axiomatic approaches (e.g., egalitarian solutions, utilitarian solutions, the Kalai Smorodinsky solution), 
the Nash solution fulfils a set of other properties: independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of 
a change of unity, weak Pareto constraint, and symmetry (Mas-Colell et al. 1995).  
The Nash solution is an equilibrium concept that should not be confused with the concept of the 
Nash equilibrium. The distinguishing features are as follows: 
i  The Nash equilibrium applies to non-cooperative games and states that the outcome of a 
game where players do not cooperate is a situation in which no player will change his/her 
strategy as long as all other players do not change their strategies;  
ii  The Nash solution applies to cooperative games and states that the issue of a negotiation 
should be individually rational and Pareto-optimal. 
Table 6 shows the different Nash solutions according to the objective adopted by governments 
and the negotiation rule defined by equations 1 and 2. The first row gives the Nash solutions when the 25 
countries/regions have no bargaining power, the second row reflects the situation in which each country 
has the same power (democratic weights; see the next subsection), and the third row reflects the situation 
when countries/regions have bargaining powers proportional to their economic sizes (Gross Domestic 
Product –GDP- source: CHELEM database,
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When maximizing exports, the Nash solution represents a very ambitious degree of liberalization 
(s1530) that benefits all players. Optimizing terms of trade is not a sustainable objective, as this criterion 
features a purely mercantilist world where international liberalization is a constant-sum game and where 
no Paretian improvement is feasible. In our study, the only possible solution under this objective would 
be a situation in which all WTO members agree on a reform that improves their terms of trade while 
deteriorating those of non-WTO members. When maximizing equivalent variation, the outcome is the 
status quo, except for liberalization of services, which gives every player a welfare gain. Considering that 
our modeling of services is relatively limited, we can focus on the result without services. In this case, 
; see the next subsection).  
                                                       
15 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/chelem.htm  
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negotiation reaches a stalemate. If governments maximize GDP, it is likely that industry will be hugely 
liberalized but market access in agriculture will be only slightly improved. 
As far as the objective of equivalent variation is concerned, Bangladesh clearly plays a key role in 
trade negotiations, as this country does not see improvement of its equivalent variation under numerous 
scenarios, due to deterioration of terms of trade and erosion of preferential margins. This illustrates the 
position of numerous developing countries/regions that have been granted significant preferences in rich 
and large markets and are highly specialized in a few products. Thus, our results suggest that the position 
of such countries forms the underlying basis for the stalemate of trade negotiations. 
In the absence of bargaining power, each player has the same influence. However, our definition 
of a player follows the countries/regions modeled herein, meaning that our disaggregation scheme 
introduces a bias into the structure of the game. By introducing bargaining power based on measurable 
country/region features, we can correct for the arbitrary choices inherent in our disaggregation. 
The Nash solution with bargaining power 
Several elements justify the allotment of more bargaining power to larger countries/regions, as follows: 
i  Multilateral trade negotiation is a process of bargaining for market access, and all players 
make it a priority to gain access to large and rich countries/regions; 
ii  Large countries/regions have strong bargaining powers based on the threat of potentially 
detrimental retaliation; and  
iii  Large countries/regions (e.g., the US, EU, Japan, Brazil, China and India) have a higher 
capacity to understand the impact of reforms and can more easily influence other WTO 
members on non-trade issues. 
Cooperative game theory allows us to account for this element. It is possible to introduce 
differentiated bargaining powers into the Nash axiomatic approach; to do this, we modifying equation 1 
by weighting each player’s surplus by αm. The Nash solution is then given by: 
 
    (3) 
 
Under the same individual rationality constraint expressed by equation (2).  
 
Two alternative weights are considered:  
i  The term αm equals the number of voices representing each country/region within the WTO 
(1 voice for the US, 1 for the EU, 2 for the Korea/Taiwan zone, 11 for the Mediterranean 
countries, etc.). This weighting structure is qualified as a “democratic”
16
ii  The term αm equals the share of the country/region in the world GDP. This is the economic 
power, and may be interpreted as an indirect way to consider a better threat point for this 
country/region in the case of trade wars or bilateral negotiations. 
 system. 
The last two rows of Table 6 present the results when we use these weights. As demonstrated 
above for the “no bargaining” case, the objectives of terms of trade optimization and equivalent variation 
maximization lead to the status quo. The individual rationality constraint considerably reduces the 
bargaining space. When exports are maximized, the Nash solution does not change. Only the Nash 
solution under the real GDP criterion is modified when weights are included. In a democratic context, the 
same solution is adopted at the end of the bargaining process, except that it does not includes SDT. This 
option has a restrictive impact on South-South trade, and is abandoned when developing countries have 
                                                       
16 “Democratic” must be interpreted as a relative concept, and should not be interpreted strictly. The term is 
herein applied to an international institution comprising members of very different sizes, populations and political 
systems.   
17 
greater decision power. In contrast, when an economic weighting system is adopted, the trade reform 
s1551 is adopted. This is clearly a compromise among the EU, Japan and other industrialized 
countries/regions. The US maximizes GDP when s1500 (i.e., large openness of industry and services) is 
adopted. 
Thus, the main conclusion of this section is as follows: if exports and GDP are not consistent 
objectives for trade negotiators, then the status quo is highly probable. In the next subsections, we 
consider three ways to avoid the status quo: the exclusion of some players, the implementation of side 
payments, and the extension of the negotiation domain.  
Excluding Some Players 
A key reason for the Doha stalemate is obviously the large number of negotiating members, which 
constrains the bargaining program. Thus, one possible solution would be to exclude some members from 
the negotiation process. As suggested by Sally (2004):  
 
"Stated baldly: only a minority of the WTO members have the bargaining power and 
capacity to advance negotiations. These are the OECD countries and about a score or so 
of advanced developing countries (most of them in the G20). Hence the key liberalizing 
and rule-making deals in the WTO must be done by the 30-plus countries (counting the 
EU as one) that account for over 80% of international trade and an even bigger share of 
foreign direct investment" (Sally 2004).  
Table 7.  Cardinal of the set of feasible and rational (IR) scenarios when player exclusion is allowed 
Exclusion threshold  Equivalent variation  R eal GDP  E xports  T erms of trade 
None  1  31  39  0 
< 2% of world GDP  59  47  142  0 
< 3% of world GDP  60  47  142  0 
< 4% of world GDP  87  47  142  112 
Note: The exclusion threshold is applied to the GDP of the player (region in the model) and not to each country 
belonging to the region. IR is the set of scenarios where all players have non-negative payoffs (individual rationality 
constraints). 
Sally’s proposal is to confine WTO trade negotiations to OECD and a few middle-income 
countries. Several points support this view:  
i  Reaching a trade accord among more than 150 countries is an extremely difficult task, as 
countries’ preferences are often quite different;  
ii  Trade negotiations require human and technical resources that are often available only to rich 
countries;  
iii  It is seen as useless and inefficient to include countries with negligible shares in world trade 
and investment;  
iv  LDCs and Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) would not have to liberalize under the 
current negotiations, so although they are not officially excluded, their lack of obligation to 
the issues at hand mean that they are functionally excluded from the negotiations and  
v  Observers often describe the past negotiations conducted under the aegis of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as a bargaining process among a few rich countries (see for 
example the Blair House agreement between the EU and US; Messerlin 1995).   
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Notably, while these justifications are particularly relevant for LDCs and SVEs, they are less so 
for emerging countries (e.g., Brazil, China and India) that have recently acquired a major role in the 
international trading system.  
It is possible to examine how the exclusion of poor countries (i.e., eliminating some of the m 
countries/regions from the optimization program) affects the negotiation. For this, we define the IR-set as 
the set of scenarios that fulfill the individual rationality constraint in each program (see equation 2). Table 
7 indicates the number of solutions in the IR-set, according to various degrees of exclusion of poor 
countries /regions (the criterion being a share in world GDP above/below a given threshold).  
Excluding countries/regions always expands the IR-set of the game. For example, when the 
equivalent variation is the objective of all negotiators, the exclusion of countries/regions with GDP < 2% 
of world GDP yields an IR-set of 59 instead of 1. When optimizing terms of trade is the objective, the 
exclusion must be large in order for the IR-set being not empty; the 4% threshold excludes India from the 
bargaining process, allowing some agreements to be reached (e.g., s1311 with economic weights, s1351 
in other cases). When negotiators maximize equivalent variation, even the 2% threshold (which excludes 
only small countries/regions) is efficient. The s1510 outcome is adopted under bargaining weights based 
on economic powers, except when the interests of all countries/regions with < 4% of world GDP are 
precluded; in these cases the US, EU, and Japan (i.e., the Triad countries) are the only negotiators and 
s1551 should be chosen (see above). With democratic weights, the outcome of trade negotiations is s1530 
for a 2% threshold, s1230 for a 3% threshold, and s1511 for a 4% threshold. Democracy undermines the 
influence of the US and EU, while improving the position of the Mediterranean countries. From a global 
point of view, restricting negotiation to richer countries/regions leads to the adoption of a less 
harmonizing tariff reduction formula in agriculture. Moreover, when only Bangladesh is excluded from 
the bargaining process, an outcome may be reached under the equivalent variation criterion. In our 
configuration, Bangladesh exemplifies the situation of LDCs and other small countries/regions that will 
experience mainly adverse effects from multilateral liberalization, due to erosion of preference and 
deterioration of terms of trade.
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Setting up Side Payments 
 
Thus, we find that the exclusion of WTO members is efficient. However, this is quite opposite to 
the essence of multilateralism. Excluding poorer countries/regions is particularly inconsistent with the 
developmental objective of this round. Therefore, the following subsection addresses a more cooperative 
solution: the inception of side payments among countries/regions. 
It is impossible to find a Pareto-superior outcome, such that the negotiation is blocked. In a cooperative 
framework, a worldwide Pareto-optimum should be agreed on when countries/regions are allowed to 
redistribute the benefits obtained from trade liberalization. Setting side payments entails a supplementary 
degree of freedom, and all outcomes are then feasible as long as total welfare increases. The “Aid For 
Trade” package cements this idea into a workable strategy (see Evenett 2005a). From an institutional 
point of view, these international transfers may take several shapes: aid for development, financing of 
facilities, adjustment packages (see IMF Anne Krueger’s proposal18
                                                       
17 This point can be extended to other small countries (e.g., Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Ecuador) that 
expressed their concerns over concluding the Doha Round without reaching a meaningful outcome on either the 
cotton or the banana issues. 
18 http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/091003.htm 
 in Cancún). For example, various 
proposals have been put forth regarding the compensation of ACP (African-Caribbean-Pacific) countries 
for preference erosion as part of the tentative banana deal reached between Latin-American producers, the 
EU and the US. Equivalent variation is the criterion that best fits these international financial transfers; 
for this reason, we herein study implementation of side payments under this objective function. 
From a mathematical point of view, the program of the cooperative game with side payments is defined 
by the equations:   
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             (4) 
 
With: 




    (6) 
Here, T
m represents the payments received/paid by m. The objective function to be maximized 
(equation 4) indicates that each country/region’s real income variation due to the trade reform is increased 
(decreased) by the side payment when it is positive (negative). Equation 5 expresses individual rationality 
and differs from equation 2 in that the side payment is included. Equation 6 means that the sum of the 
international transfers is balanced. 
 
It can be shown that the optimal solution s* is defined by: 
 
       (7) 
At the optimum, a player should get share α
m of the total gain (i.e., his/her bargaining power). If 
all players have the same power (the un-weighted situation), the final distribution of gains must be even. 
Otherwise, a player will use his/her veto power to block the outcome.  Therefore, the more uneven the 
initial distribution, the larger the redistribution. 
Keeping in mind that the Nash bargaining game describes a redistribution process on an absolute 
level of gains, we see that attributing the same bargaining power to different players means they will try 
to obtain the same share of the overall gain. However, identical shares can represent very different 
relative gains (the final payment compared to each player’s initial real income). Adopting a weighting 
scheme that provides the same bargaining power to both large and small countries/regions may be 
quixotic, since an even distribution of absolute gains will lead to a very extreme distribution of relative 
gains. Using GDP weights allows us to correct for such a problem. However, a development-friendly 
outcome of the DDA may target the reduction of world inequalities, meaning that the gains of developing 
countries/regions should be more than proportional to their initial GDP. The “un-weighted” and 
“democratic” weighting schemes have such properties. 
When setting side payments, a first-best solution may be agreed on (i.e. s1531); this is the most 
ambitious scenario in terms of liberalization. When services are excluded from negotiation, the solution is 
s0531. Implementation of transfers allows the negotiations to reach its worldwide first-best equilibrium.  
Table 8.  Nash solutions with side payments 
Global transfers (US$ bn)  Un-weighted  Democratic  Economic weights (GDP) 
With liberalization in services  66.4  80.7  44.0 
Without liberalization in services  63.2  78.8  44.1 
 
The total amount of international transfers is shown in Table 8. Notably, the international 
transfers are very large. As discussed in Section 3, the more efficient the reform, the larger the global gain 
and the higher its dispersion. So, in a sense the large sizes of these transfers are due to the consensus rule 
and the right of veto given to each WTO member. They are much larger (between 20 and 30 times larger, 
in fact) than the amounts the countries/regions need to make up for the losses induced by the negotiated 
outcome. This is because countries/regions do not only need to be compensated for losses (the difference 
between the initial equivalent variation and the equivalent variation generated by reform),  but also for not  
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receiving the average gain. These transfers add up to between 40% and 80% of the total welfare gain and 
represent a considerable financial compensation. Moreover, the more power the rich countries/regions 
have, the smaller the transfers. For a similar reason, the “democratic” weighting scheme induces large 
redistribution, since most WTO members are small economies that will see little or no gain. The 
liberalization of services, by increasing the size of the cake, leads to more redistribution except in the case 
of bargaining power based on economic size (this is specifically due to the situation in the US; see 
below).  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of transfers under side payments; services are included in the 
liberalization process and the Nash solution is defined with and without bargaining powers. This solution 
defines three net payers who are among the main beneficiaries from the liberalization process, namely the 
EU, EFTA, and Japan. This finding is obviously related to the presence of a tariff structure with numerous 
peaks. Japan pays US$40bn to other countries/regions upon a total gain of US$45bn. For LDCs, the 
obtained side payments are the only source of gain (e.g., Bangladesh and SSA) and are quite significant 
(about 2.5% of SSA’s income.) The weighted case is obviously more advantageous for rich 
countries/regions. For example the EU does not pay anything, Japan’s payment is reduced by about 25%, 
and the US receives large payments (US$34bn).  When services are excluded, the profile of the 
distribution is similar. The larger side payments received by the US are noteworthy because this country 
also gains from trade liberalization in services.  
Figure 2.  Distribution of transfers among players (in US$ bn) 
 
Note:  EFTA for European Free Trade Association; EU25 for European Union (25 countries); Korea_Tw for Korea and Taiwan; 
MediterraneanCo. for Mediterranean Countries; ROCentAm for Rest of Central America; ROAsia for Rest of Asia; RoSouAm 
for Rest of South America; SubSahAf for SubSaharan Africa. The most ambitious scenario is the optimal outcome with transfers 
(s1531) when transfers are allowed. A negative transfer is a payment made, a positive one is a payment received.   
Extending the Domain of Negotiation 
Another possible solution is to extend the objective of the negotiation. For example, the introduction of 
Singapore issues such as trade facilitation, or (more generally) the inclusion of services in the negotiation 
might be viewed as extending the domain of negotiation, since countries/regions that lose due to the 










Unweighted GDP weighted 
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services. As it is not possible to extend the negotiation domain from the situation depicted in the previous 
section, we consider a restriction of this domain and evaluate the IR-set of the game when the negotiation 
takes place only in agriculture, industry, services, or export subsidies. Table 9 illustrates the results of this 
investigation; for each criterion (equivalent variation, real GDP, or terms of trade), we can compare the 
number of scenarios in the set of feasible issues (column Domain) with the number of scenarios in the IR-
set (column IR-set). 
A negotiation among all players gives rise to a quasi-stalemate (even when all dimensions are 
included) when players maximize the equivalent variation; in this case, the only solution is  a 
liberalization of services. Furthermore, under these conditions a complete stalemate is reached when the 
objective is the optimization of terms of trade. Therefore, we also consider situations in which we exclude 
countries/regions representing < 2% and < 4% of the world GDP. 
Table 9.  Impact of an extension of the negotiation domain (IR) 
Criteria  Dimension  C ard of the   C ard of the I R  set 
    scenarios set  All players  E xclusion at 2%  of 
world GDP 




Services  1  1  1  1 
Industry  5  0  0  5 
Agriculture  5  0  0  0 
Export subsidies  1  0  0  1 




Services  1  1  1  1 
Industry  5  5  5  5 
Agriculture  5  0  0  0 
Export subsidies  1  1  1  1 
All dimensions  143  47  47  47 
Terms of trade 
Services  1  0  0  0 
 
Industry  5  0  0  2 
Agriculture  5  0  0  0 
Exports subsidies  1  0  0  1 
All dimensions  143  0  0  112 
Note:  The results for the “all dimensions” rows mimic the information in Table 8. IR is the set of scenarios where all players 
have non-negative payoffs (individual rationality constraints). 
It appears from Table 9 that an extension of the domain of negotiation systematically increases 
the number of trade reforms that countries/regions can potentially agree on. The agricultural sector 
appears once again at the cornerstone of the trade negotiations. Regardless of the negotiators’ objective or 
the tested scheme of country/region participation (all players, exclusion at 2% of world GDP, or exclusion 
at 4% of world GDP), we do not see any solution other than the status quo if the negotiation takes place 
only in agriculture; the IR-set of the game is systematically empty. When the objective is equivalent 
variation and we exclude countries/regions with < 2% of world GDP, a negotiation in all dimensions is 
especially beneficial, as shown by an IR-set of 59 potential agreements instead of the 0 agreements 
reached if the negotiation takes place only in agriculture or industry.   
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5.  ANALYZING COALITIONS 
Since 1995, the function of the WTO has clearly been affected by coalitions whose the raison d’être has 
not been precisely explained in the economic literature. The case of the G20 clearly illustrates this point; 
this coalition gathers countries as diverse (in terms of trade characteristics) as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, China, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, etc. Thus, it is useful to examine the role and 
impact of such coalitions. We suppose that a coalition is justified when small players have been excluded 
from a negotiation, and see the formation of a coalition as a means to continue participating. The presence 
of small countries/regions in a negotiation that is supposedly taking place only among large countries 
deeply affects the cooperative game. To exemplify this, we examine the situation in which a 4% threshold 
has been applied; in this case, if no coalition is introduced, the Nash solution is determined by taking into 
account only gains for the Triad countries (i.e., the US, EU, and Japan).  
Table 10.  Effects of the G-10 coalition on its members (in US$ bn) 
Country  Un-weighted  GDP weights  Democratic weights 
EFTA  0  4.6  0.3 
Japan  0  44.4  1.2 
Korea-Taiwan  0  4.2  0.2 
Note:  This table represents the change in real income for the different members of the G-10 upon the coalition’s appearance. The 
exclusion threshold is set to 4% of world GDP, meaning that the reference situation is the case in which only the US, EU and 
Japan participate in the negotiations. The presence of the G-90 and/or G-20 does not allow the G-10 to modify the outcome of the 
game; these cases are not represented here. 
Table 11.  Effects of the G-20 coalition on its members (in US$ bn USD) 
  G-20 facing the Triad (US, EU, Japan)   G-20 facing the Triad and the G10 








Argentina  0.6  1.0  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.4 
Brazil  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
Chile  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
China  1.1  3.9  1.1  1.1  0.8  0.8 
India  1.6  3.6  1.6  1.6  1.0  1.1 
Mexico  1.4  2.5  1.4  1.4  1.0  1.0 
RoCentAm  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
RoSouthAm  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2 
South Africa  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Thailand  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Note:  RoCentAm for Rest of Central America; RoSouthAm for Rest of South America. This table represents the 
change in real income for the different members of the G-20 upon the coalition’s appearance. The exclusion 
threshold is set to 4% of world GDP. The presence of the G-90 does not allow the G-20 to modify the outcome of 
the game; this case is not represented here. 
Figures in bold indicate countries that move from losses to positive gains upon implementation of the coalition. 
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Table 12.  Effects of the G-90 coalition on its members (US$ bn) 




Un-weighted  0.3  -1.3  1.1 
GDP Weighted  0.3  0.8  1.5 
Democratic weights  0.3  -1.3  1.1 
 
Triad + G-10 
Un-weighted  0.3  -1.3  1.1 
GDP Weighted  0.3  -1.7  0.9 
Democratic weights  0.3  -1.6  1.0 
         
Triad + G-20 
Un-weighted  0.2  -2.5  0.6 
GDP Weighted  0.3  -2.3  0.7 
Democratic weights  0.2  -2.5  0.6 
 
Triad + G-10 + G-20 
Un-weighted  0.2  -2.5  0.6 
GDP Weighted  0.3  -2.3  0.7 
Democratic weights  0.2  -2.5  0.6 
Note:  This table represents the change in real income for the different members of the G90 upon the coalition’s appearance. The 
exclusion threshold is set to 4% of world GDP.  South Africa is not represented here, but the existence of the G-90 always 
reduces its gains. Figures in bold indicate countries that move from losses to positive gains upon implementation of the coalition. 
Table 13.  Effects of the coalitions on gains by the EU and US (US$ bn) 
  Un-weighted  GDP weights  Democratic weights 
Game configuration  EU25  USA  EU25  USA  EU25  USA 
Triad + G-10  0.0  0.0  1.9  -2.8  1.4  -0.4 
Triad + G-20  -11.4  -2.0  -3.0  -5.1  -11.4  -2.0 
Triad + G-90  -27.5  0.1  -18.3  -3.3  -27.5  0.1 
Triad + G-10 + G-20  -11.4  -2.0  -3.0  -5.1  -11.4  -2.0 
Triad + G-10 + G-90  -27.5  0.1  -18.3  -3.3  -27.5  0.1 
Triad + G-20 + G-90  -27.5  0.1  -18.3  -3.3  -27.5  0.1 
Triad + G-10 + G-20 + G-90  -27.5  0.1  -18.3  -3.3  -27.5  0.1 
Note:   The Triad is composed of the EU, US and Japan; these three countries have GDPs above 4% of world 
GDP, which is the threshold we have chosen for participating in the negotiations. 
The reference situation is the scenario chosen when only the Triad participates in the negotiations. 
 
Numerous coalitions of countries appeared during the eight years of the Doha negotiations. 
Among them, the G90, G20, and G10 have been especially effective, and are studied herein. Assuming 
that each WTO country has veto power under the principle of unanimity, it is difficult to justify the 
appearance of coalitions. Indeed, Harsanyi’s paradox (Harsanyi 1977) notes that by pooling their veto 
capacity, players lose bargaining power. However, we feel that coalitions allow small countries to gather 
in order to participate in negotiations from which they would otherwise be excluded. 
As far as the consequences of a coalition, we compare the gain obtained by each country/region 
in the presence and absence of a coalition. For a country/region, participation in the coalition implies that 
its interests are taken into account, while such interests are not accounted for in the absence of the 
coalition, and/or because the formation of this coalition entails a change in the set of agreeable reforms  
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and in the solution of the cooperative game. Moreover, we assume that the bargaining power of a 
coalition equals the sum of its members’ bargaining powers.
19
The situation for G-20 members is displayed in Table 11. This coalition improves the welfare of 
all of its members, especially when bargaining powers are based on GDP size. In this case, seven of the 
10 G-20 countries/regions modeled herein move from net losses to net gains when we switch from the 
s1551
 Tables 10 to 13 show these comparisons 
for different countries/regions in different game configurations (with or without other coalitions, with or 
without bargaining power). 
Table 10 provides the results for the G-10, which is a very stable coalition that provides gains to 
all its members. The situation of Japan is strongly improved (+44bn) when we introduce the participation 
constraints of the other G-10 members; this is especially noteworthy for GDP weights. The G-10 is 
worthwhile for its members only if they have to face the US and EU. However, in the presence of other 
coalitions (G-20 and G-90), the G-10 does not influence the final outcome of the game. 
20
                                                       
19 An existing coalition larger than the fixed threshold keeps its right of veto when individual rationality is not 
satisfied. 
20 We consider that s1551 is the scenario closest to the US-EU agreement that preceded the Cancùn meeting. 
 (weighted case) outcome selected by the Triad to the s1210 situation, in which NAMA 
liberalization is limited, SDT is introduced, and the AMA tariff reduction is deepened with a moderate 
Swiss formula coefficient instead of the linear formula chosen by the Triad. In the presence of the G-10, 
the G-20 still has incentives to appear. However, the presence of the G-90 eliminates the incentives for 
the G-20 to appear. Indeed, the G-90 allows small economies to step back in the arena and enforce their 
participation constraints; they empty the core of the game, meaning that there is only one possible 
outcome (i.e., s1000, which is the status quo or the unique liberalization of services, depending on the 
possibility of negotiating in this sector). The presence or absence of other players cannot modify the 
outcome. In all configurations, India benefits the most from the G-20 implementation. 
The G-90 (Table 12) is the most interesting coalition. By allowing Bangladesh to reenter the 
negotiations, the presence of this coalition empties the core of the game. The G90 allows both Sub-
Saharan countries and Bangladesh to avoid the losses from the outcomes that would be negotiated by the 
other players if these small and vulnerable countries were excluded. Therefore, the G-90 always improves 
the  situation of both Sub-Saharan countries and Bangladesh. For the Mediterranean countries, in contrast, 
status quo in AMA and NAMA is not the best outcome. These countries would prefer a liberalization 
scheme that is agreed upon by the largest players. For this reason, the G-90 brings them net losses. 
Finally, the G-90 is never useful for South Africa; this country is always better off when playing with the 
G-20. These two last remarks illustrate the heterogeneity of the interests inside this coalition. 
We conclude by looking at the effects of these coalitions on EU and US gains (Table 13). As 
expected, in most situations the gains of the two major players are negatively impacted by the appearance 
of counter-powers. This is particularly true for the EU in the presence of the G-90, which blocks 
negotiations and eliminates nearly all of the EU’s gains. The G-20 also cuts the EU’s payoff by more than 
half. On the other hand, the presence of the G-10 improves the situation of the EU in its negotiations with 
the US. For the US, the effects are much more limited in absolute terms, but the presence of the G-20 still 
cuts gains by about 80% in the different weighting scheme configurations. Notably, the GDP-based 
weighting scheme is highly interesting for the US. Under this weighting scheme, the US can get a very 
positive outcome when facing Japan and the EU. However, the limitations introduced by other coalitions 
considerably reduce the US’s gains. When the bargaining power of the US is diluted (un-weighted or 
democratic weights), there are only limited gains in the reference situation and the effects of the coalitions 
are reduced (G-20 or G-10) or even positive (G-90). In the latter case and contrary to our findings for the 
EU, the emptying of the core by the presence of the G-90 is positive for the US, since it leads to 
liberalization only in services, where the US has a strong comparative advantage.  
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6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, the simultaneous use of CGE analysis and game theory allows us to explain some strategic 
features of the DDA trade negotiations. In particular, we see that agricultural market access talks play a 
crucial role: they increase the overall gain but also reduce the inequalities driven by NAMA liberalization. 
Simultaneously, trade negotiation cannot take place if only liberalization in agriculture is negotiated, as 
the core of the game would be empty. Moreover, the adoption of tariff-harmonizing formulae (more cuts 
in higher import tariffs) leads to greatly increased global gains. Finally, the dramatic complexity in the 
current structure of protection and market access convincingly explains why trade negotiations are so 
difficult today. Thus, it does not seem surprising that our game theoretic CGE approach concludes with a 
rather pessimistic statement: status quo is often the Nash solution.  
Obviously, the number of negotiating members adds constraints to the bargaining program. We 
show that the exclusion of countries/regions with GDPs below a certain threshold drastically improves the 
efficiency of the negotiation process, regardless of the governments’ objective. We also demonstrate that 
the formation of coalitions is a potential means through which developing countries/regions may block 
solutions imposed by rich countries/regions. The G-20 coalition is successful with the inclusion of the 
SDT clause and with less liberalization of the industrial sector. Moreover the G-10 is always beneficial 
for its members. We also consider the expansion of the domain of trade negotiation. Negotiating in 
services, industry and agriculture is more efficient than negotiating in only industry and agriculture, 
which is itself more efficient than negotiating in agriculture alone. Side payments may also be a workable 
solution, as they allow large agents to maximize the size of the cake, while compensating losers. When 
we implement a cooperative solution of the game with side payments, we find that the exchange of 
financial flows for signed agreements represent a significant share of global income gain. Notably, 
however, in one solution, side payments are used to remunerate very rich countries/regions (e.g., the US). 
Both characteristics of this cooperative solution make it implausible.   
An illustration of the realistic aspect of our conclusions is that WTO Director-General Pascal 
Lamy is currently combining the three solutions that we propose herein, in the hopes of breaking the 
stalemate. i. He has sought to expand the coverage of the negotiations. We feel that more could be done in 
this regard, especially with the inclusion of the Singapore issues. ii. He has excluded WTO members from 
the negotiation process (most of the WTO Geneva meetings in July of 2008 took place among seven 
countries). iii. He has sought to implement side payments (“Aid For Trade” can be interpreted along these 
lines).  Let us note that there may be other means to compensate for losses related to erosion of 
preferences, such as granting new preferences (e.g., see the Duty Free Quota Free regime given by rich 
countries to LDCs at the Hong-Kong Ministerial). Given the complexity of the current trade and 
protection structures, negotiators must be highly creative when designing a final trade agreement that 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1: Characteristics of the 143 scenarios in terms of welfare gains and their distribution 
Scenario 
Global gains (US$ 
bn2001)  Global gains (% ) 
Un-weighted average 
gains (% ) 
Standard deviation 
of average gains (un-
weighted) 
s0001  1.00  0.00  -0.01  0.03 
s0010  71.40  0.22  0.43  0.49 
s0011  75.23  0.24  0.42  0.51 
s0020  68.51  0.22  0.40  0.49 
s0021  72.19  0.23  0.39  0.51 
s0030  75.35  0.24  0.48  0.56 
s0031  79.82  0.25  0.48  0.58 
s0040  72.98  0.23  0.46  0.56 
s0041  77.24  0.24  0.45  0.58 
s0050  14.41  0.05  0.08  0.08 
s0051  15.79  0.05  0.06  0.09 
s0100  9.56  0.03  -0.05  0.28 
s0101  10.52  0.03  -0.06  0.29 
s0110  81.06  0.25  0.38  0.60 
s0111  84.85  0.27  0.37  0.63 
s0120  78.14  0.25  0.34  0.61 
s0121  81.80  0.26  0.34  0.64 
s0130  85.00  0.27  0.43  0.66 
s0131  89.44  0.28  0.43  0.69 
s0140  82.60  0.26  0.40  0.67 
s0141  86.83  0.27  0.40  0.70 
s0150  24.20  0.08  0.03  0.31 
s0151  25.55  0.08  0.01  0.33 
s0200  8.61  0.03  -0.01  0.25 
s0201  9.58  0.03  -0.03  0.27 
s0210  80.10  0.25  0.41  0.58 
s0211  83.92  0.26  0.41  0.61 
s0220  77.19  0.24  0.38  0.59 
s0221  80.87  0.25  0.37  0.62 
s0230  84.05  0.26  0.47  0.64 
s0231  88.51  0.28  0.46  0.68 
s0240  81.65  0.26  0.44  0.65 
s0241  85.91  0.27  0.43  0.68 
s0250  23.21  0.07  0.06  0.29 
s0251  24.58  0.08  0.05  0.30 
s0300  10.32  0.03  -0.08  0.30 
s0301  11.27  0.04  -0.10  0.32  
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Table A1: Characteristics of the 143 scenarios in terms of welfare gains and their distribution 
(continued) 
Scenario 
Global gains (US$ 
bn2001)  Global gains (%) 
Un-weighted average 
gains (%) 
Standard deviation of 
average gains (un-
weighted) 
s0310  81.78  0.26  0.34  0.62 
s0311  85.56  0.27  0.34  0.65 
s0320  78.87  0.25  0.31  0.63 
s0321  82.51  0.26  0.30  0.66 
s0330  85.71  0.27  0.39  0.68 
s0331  90.14  0.28  0.39  0.71 
s0340  83.31  0.26  0.37  0.69 
s0341  87.53  0.28  0.36  0.72 
s0350  24.98  0.08  -0.01  0.34 
s0351  26.32  0.08  -0.02  0.36 
s0400  9.96  0.03  -0.03  0.28 
s0401  10.92  0.03  -0.04  0.30 
s0410  81.43  0.26  0.39  0.59 
s0411  85.23  0.27  0.39  0.62 
s0420  78.52  0.25  0.36  0.60 
s0421  82.18  0.26  0.36  0.63 
s0430  85.36  0.27  0.45  0.65 
s0431  89.81  0.28  0.44  0.68 
s0440  82.97  0.26  0.42  0.66 
s0441  87.21  0.27  0.42  0.69 
s0450  24.60  0.08  0.05  0.31 
s0451  25.95  0.08  0.03  0.33 
s0500  14.05  0.04  -0.04  0.30 
s0501  15.00  0.05  -0.06  0.31 
s0510  85.46  0.27  0.38  0.63 
s0511  89.25  0.28  0.37  0.66 
s0520  82.57  0.26  0.35  0.64 
s0521  86.22  0.27  0.34  0.67 
s0530  89.38  0.28  0.43  0.69 
s0531  93.81  0.30  0.43  0.72 
s0540  87.00  0.27  0.40  0.69 
s0541  91.23  0.29  0.40  0.72 
s0550  28.70  0.09  0.03  0.34 
s0551  30.05  0.09  0.02  0.35 
s1000  11.13  0.03  0.06  0.06 
s1001  12.13  0.04  0.05  0.06 
s1010  82.62  0.26  0.49  0.51 
s1011  86.44  0.27  0.48  0.52 
s1020  79.72  0.25  0.46  0.51  
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Table A1: Characteristics of the 143 scenarios in terms of welfare gains and their distribution 
(continued) 
cenario 
Global gains (US$ 
bn2001)  Global gains (%) 
Un-weighted average 
gains (%) 
Standard deviation of 
average gains (un-
weighted) 
s1021  83.40  0.26  0.45  0.52 
s1030  86.57  0.27  0.54  0.58 
s1031  91.04  0.29  0.54  0.59 
s1040  84.20  0.26  0.52  0.57 
s1041  88.46  0.28  0.51  0.59 
s1050  25.55  0.08  0.14  0.10 
s1051  26.93  0.08  0.12  0.11 
s1100  20.71  0.07  0.01  0.27 
s1101  21.67  0.07  0.00  0.29 
s1110  92.29  0.29  0.44  0.61 
s1111  96.08  0.30  0.43  0.64 
s1120  89.37  0.28  0.40  0.62 
s1121  93.02  0.29  0.40  0.65 
s1130  96.24  0.30  0.49  0.67 
s1131  100.68  0.32  0.49  0.70 
s1140  93.84  0.30  0.46  0.68 
s1141  98.07  0.31  0.46  0.71 
s1150  35.35  0.11  0.09  0.31 
s1151  36.70  0.12  0.08  0.33 
s1200  19.75  0.06  0.05  0.25 
s1201  20.73  0.07  0.03  0.27 
s1210  91.33  0.29  0.47  0.59 
s1211  95.15  0.30  0.47  0.62 
s1220  88.42  0.28  0.44  0.60 
s1221  92.09  0.29  0.43  0.63 
s1230  95.29  0.30  0.53  0.65 
s1231  99.75  0.31  0.52  0.68 
s1240  92.89  0.29  0.50  0.66 
s1241  97.14  0.31  0.49  0.69 
s1250  34.37  0.11  0.12  0.29 
s1251  35.73  0.11  0.11  0.30 
s1300  21.46  0.07  -0.02  0.30 
s1301  22.41  0.07  -0.03  0.31 
s1310  93.01  0.29  0.40  0.63 
s1311  96.79  0.30  0.40  0.66 
s1320  90.10  0.28  0.37  0.64 
s1321  93.74  0.29  0.36  0.66 
s1330  96.95  0.30  0.46  0.69 
s1331  101.37  0.32  0.45  0.72 
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Table A1: Characteristics of the 143 scenarios in terms of welfare gains and their distribution 
(continued) 
Scenario 
Global gains (US$ 
bn2001)  Global gains (%) 
Un-weighted average 
gains (%) 
Standard deviation of 
average gains (un-
weighted) 
s1340  94.55  0.30  0.43  0.69 
s1341  98.77  0.31  0.43  0.72 
s1350  36.13  0.11  0.06  0.34 
s1351  37.47  0.12  0.04  0.35 
s1400  21.10  0.07  0.03  0.28 
s1401  22.06  0.07  0.02  0.29 
s1410  92.66  0.29  0.46  0.60 
s1411  96.46  0.30  0.45  0.63 
s1420  89.75  0.28  0.42  0.61 
s1421  93.41  0.29  0.42  0.64 
s1430  96.60  0.30  0.51  0.66 
s1431  101.05  0.32  0.51  0.69 
s1440  94.21  0.30  0.48  0.67 
s1441  98.44  0.31  0.48  0.70 
s1450  35.75  0.11  0.11  0.31 
s1451  37.11  0.12  0.10  0.33 
s1500  25.20  0.08  0.02  0.30 
s1501  26.15  0.08  0.00  0.32 
s1510  96.69  0.30  0.44  0.64 
s1511  100.48  0.32  0.44  0.67 
s1520  93.80  0.29  0.41  0.65 
s1521  97.45  0.31  0.40  0.68 
s1530  100.62  0.32  0.49  0.70 
s1531  105.05  0.33  0.49  0.73 
s1540  98.24  0.31  0.47  0.71 
s1541  102.47  0.32  0.46  0.74 
s1550  39.87  0.13  0.09  0.34 
s1551  41.21  0.13  0.08  0.36 
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